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SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE STANDING? A REVIEW OF 
STANDING UNDER THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 
Joseph Mendelson, III* 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago, Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) 
to combat the growing problems of pets stolen for use in medical 
research and abusive animal research practices.1 The AWA has been 
amended several times since its passage in 1966 which has resulted 
in considerable expansion of the statute's original purpose and scope.2 
Currently, the AWA governs not only federal animal research facili-
ties but also numerous activities involving the treatment of animals. 
The Act also defines and regulates parties directly involved with 
handling animals including pet dealers, animal exhibitors, and federal 
medical research grant recipients.3 
Despite the expanding reach of the AWNs regulatory regime, there 
is general consensus that the statute has failed to fulfill its potential 
in fostering the humane treatment of animals.4 The AWNs relative 
* Director of Legal Affairs for the International Center for Technology Assessment (CTA), a 
non-profit organization devoted to exploring the economic, environmental, ethical, political, and 
social impacts that can result from the application of technology or technological systems. He 
received his B.A. from Colgate University in 1988 and is a 1991 graduate of the George 
Washington University Law School. 
1 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994). 
2 See Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970); Animal Welfare 
Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (1976); Pub. L. No. 99--198, Title 
XVII, 99 Stat. 1650 (1985) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159). 
3 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2132. 
4 See, e.g., Nicole Fox, The Inadequate Protection of Animals Against Cruel Animal Hus-
bandry Practices Under United States Law, 17 WHITrIER L. REV. 145, 146--47 (1995); Karen L. 
McDonald, Creating A Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 399, 402--08 (1986). 
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ineffectiveness has been attributed to many causes, including the 
law's often vague terminology and inadequate regulatory implemen-
tation by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). A 
primary factor in undermining the AWNs objectives, however, is the 
inability of third parties, specifically animal welfare and animal rights 
organizations, to litigate claims successfully against the federal gov-
ernment and individual violators under the statute. In virtually all 
AWA claims, legal failures result not from any deficiency on the merits 
of the cases brought before the courts, but rather from jurisdictional 
challenges to third parties.5 In particular, standing has become a near 
insurmountable difficulty for third parties seeking a hearing on the 
substantive claims they have brought under the statute. 
This article explores the current state of third-party standing un-
der the AWA. While the analysis reveals the considerable difficulty in 
achieving third-party standing under the AWA, it also dispels the 
prevalent notion that the statute necessarily prevents third parties 
from having their day in court. The article is divided into four parts. 
Section I provides an overview of the AWNs legislative history. Sec-
tion II contains a brief review of the standing requirements. Section 
III is an analysis of standing in past cases brought under the AWA. 
Section IV discusses the potential for pet consumers to be granted 
standing under the AWA. 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 
In 1965, United States Representative Joseph Y. Resnick (R-NY) 
called an animal dealer in his district to inquire about a missing 
Dalmatian that had been kept on the dealer's property.6 Incensed by 
the dealer's lack of concern for the missing pet, the congressman 
introduced a bill in Congress to regulate the trafficking of dogs and 
cats for research.7 In 1966, Congress enacted the Federal Laboratory 
Animal Welfare Act,S later to be named the AWA, to address the 
abuses that developed as a result of the Nation's vast program of 
medical research, particularly research involving experimentation with 
5 See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 498--99 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
[hereinafter ALDF 1]. 
6 See David Masci, Fighting Over Animal Rights: Has Public Support for the Movement 
Peaked?, THE CQ RESEARCHER, Aug. 2,1996, at 673--96. 
7 See id. 
S See Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 1, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 
(1994». 
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animals.9 More specifically, the legislation was passed in response to 
public fears that their pets would be stolen and sold to researchers. IO 
Prompted by the need to curb this illicit trade of stolen household pets 
for use in research facilities, Congress passed the AWA and designed 
it to: (1) protect dog and cat owners from the theft of their pets for 
use in research facilities; (2) prevent the sale or use of stolen dogs and 
cats in research facilities; and (3) insure that certain animals receive 
humane care and treatment in research facilities. ll 
Congress also recognized that state laws were not dealing ade-
quately with the widespread problem of animal theft.12 State legisla-
tors and enforcement agencies simply could not deal with the growing 
volume of stolen animals.13 Their efforts were hampered further by 
the interstate nature of most operations selling or using stolen ani-
mals.14 As noted in the Senate's report on the bill: 
The demand for research animals has risen to such proportions 
that a system of unregulated dealers is now supplying hundreds 
of thousands of dogs, cats, and other animals to research facilities 
each year. . . . Stolen pets are quickly transported across State 
lines, changing hands rapidly ... [and] State laws ... proved 
inadequate both in the apprehending and conviction of the thieves 
who operate in this interstate operation.15 
Further, the legislators recognized that much of the responsibility for 
creating the huge demand for medical research animals rested with 
the Federal Government's vast program of medical research, much of 
which involved animal experimentation.16 
As its title implies, the A W A was designed primarily to assure the 
humane treatment of animalsP The 1966 version of the AWA: pro-
9 See Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
10 See H.R. REP. No. 94--801, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 758, 759; see also 
Fox, supra note 4, at 166 (discussing how a magazine article containing photographs depicting 
abusive treatment of stolen dogs by animal dealers initiated the public outcry and that Congress 
received more mail on the pending animal welfare bills than on civil rights or Vietnam). 
11 See 7 U.S.C. § 2131; Robert J. Masonis, The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals 
Act and the Proposed Regulations: A Glimmer of Hope in the Battle Against Abusive Animal 
Research, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 149, 153 (1988). 
12 See S. REP. No. 89-1281, at 4-6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2636. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 Id. at 2636; see also David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights 
for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 766 (1995). 
16 See S. REP. No. 89-1281, at 4-6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2636; Fox, 
supra note 4, at 166. 
17 See Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 89-1848, at 1 
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tected owners of dogs and cats from the theft of such pets; regulated 
the transportation, purchase, sale, handling, and treatment of dogs, 
cats, and certain other animals destined for use in research or experi-
mentation; and regulated the handling, care, and treatment of dogs, 
cats, and certain other animals in research facilities.18 To achieve these 
objectives, the AWA required that the Secretary of Agricuiture19 
issue licenses to animal dealers as defined by the law's provisions,20 
made it unlawful for research facilities to purchase dogs and cats from 
unlicensed dealers,21 and authorized the Secretary to promulgate regu-
lations governing the humane handling, care, treatment, and trans-
portation of animals by dealers and research facilities.22 
Motivated by a concerned public, Congress revisited the AWA in 
1970 and enlarged the number of protected animal species.23 The 
amendment extended the definition of "animal" to "all" warm-blooded 
animals designated by the Secretary with only limited and specifically 
defined exceptions.24 Further, Congress expanded the classes of peo-
ple subject to the Act's statutory provisions,25 including for the first 
time animal exhibitors and wholesale pet dealers.26 Additionally, the 
amendments recognized the need to supply animals with basic neces-
sities by requiring the Secretary to promulgate standards estab-
lishing "the basic creature comforts of adequate housing, ample food 
and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, [and] sufficient 
ventilation."27 Finally, the 1970 amendments strengthened the Secretary 
of Agriculture's enforcement powers by increasing penalties against 
individuals convicted of interfering with government inspectors, and 
expanding the discovery procedures for obtaining information.28 The 
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2650, 2653 (the 1966 act limited the definition of 
"animal" to live dogs, cats, monkeys (all nonhuman primate mammals), guinea pigs, hamsters, 
and rabbits). 
18 See S. REP. No. 89--1281, at 6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2637. 
19 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, a division of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, administers the AWA. 
20 See S. REP. No. 89-1281, at 6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2639. 
21 See id. at 2638. 
22 See id. at 2639. 
23 See 116 CONGo REC. H40,159 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1970) (statement of Rep. Mizell). 
24 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 1,2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5104. 
25 See Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970); see also 116 CONGo REC. H40,155 (daily ed. 
Dec. 7, 1970) (statement of Rep. Foley); Haviland V. Butz, 543 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
("The Animal Welfare Act of 1970 expanded the coverage of the 1966 statute to enlarge the 
class of protected animals and to regulate their use for exhibition purposes or as pets as well 
as their use for research purposes."). 
26 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5104. 
27Id. 
28 See id. at 5105. 
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legislators proclaimed the 1970 amendments part of a "continuing 
commitment by Congress to the ethic of kindness to dumb animals."29 
Despite the changes in the AWA, Congressional hearings through-
out the early 1970s continued to document widespread animal abuse.30 
This included an extensive record on abuse of animals in the course 
of air and other long distance transportation, and in the organization 
of animal fights.31 Public concern about these animal welfare issues 
prompted Congress to revisit the AWA in 1976.32 In the Animal Wel-
fare Amendments of 1976, Congress specifically targeted animal treat-
ment during transportation and the use of animals in animal fights.33 
The amendments extended the Act to cover intermediate handlers 
and carriers who were not covered under prior provisions,34 and es-
tablished a criminal penalty for persons involved in animal fighting.35 
Additionally, the amendments extended the definition of "animal" to 
include hunting dogs,36 and established uniform civil penalties for any 
A WA violation.37 
In 1985, following a highly publicized scandal involving the shocking 
mistreatment of baboons at the University of Pennsylvania,38 and 
after the release of a General Accounting Office (GAO) report critical 
of the USDA's Animal Welfare Program,39 Congress again amended 
the AWA with the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act.40 
In general, the amendments focused on further reforming institu-
29 [d. at 5104. 
30 See, e.g., 122 CONGo REC. H2860 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1976) (statement of Rep. Foley). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94--801, at 24 (1976), reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 758, 776 (statement of Donald S. Frederickson, Director, National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), stating that NIH "understand[sl this is intended to eliminate a major 
problem with the shipment of unhealthy or unsound dogs and cats for the pet trade"). 
34 See H.R. REP. No. 94--801, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 758. 
35 See id. at 796-97. 
36 See id. at 758-59; see also 122 CONGo REC. H2871 (1976) (statement of Rep. Burke). 
37 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-976, at 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 794. 
38 In 1984, an animal rights group called the Animal Liberation Front released videotapes 
stolen from the Head Injury Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania. The tapes showed 
government-funded experiments in which baboons were knocked repeatedly on their heads 
without first being properly anesthetized. Other scenes recorded the primates coming out of 
anesthesia before doctors had finished operating on their brains. The tapes were viewed by 
millions of television viewers across the country. See Masci, supra note 6, at 673-96. 
39 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE'S ANIMAL WELFARE 
PROGRAM, DOCUMENT No. RCED 85--8 (May 16, 1985). This report found, inter alia, that the 
Animal Plant Health and Inspection Service encountered major difficulties in administering the 
AWA because of inadequate funding. These problems included inadequate inspections, both in 
frequency and quality, and poor training in the Agency's regional and area offices. 
40 See Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985); see also Masonis, supra note 11, at 156-58. 
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tional treatment of laboratory animals and providing such animals 
increased protection from abusive research.41 To ensure such goals 
were met, Congress directed the Secretary to establish requirements 
for: (1) the use of anesthetics, analgesics, tranquilizing drugs, and 
euthanasia when appropriate;42 (2) the consideration by the principal 
investigator of alternatives to any procedure likely to cause pain or 
distress in an animal;43 (3) the consultation with a veterinarian in 
planning research protocols that could cause pain to animals;44 and (4) 
the use of animals in only one major operation, from which they are 
allowed to recover, unless it is a scientific necessity, or the Secretary 
deems that special circumstances require further research to be con-
ducted.45 
The amendments also created an internal review mechanism for 
each research facility known as an Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee (IACUC),46 which was made responsible for representing 
the public's concerns for the welfare of laboratory animals in experi-
ments.47 Congress addressed the GAO Report findings by giving the 
Secretary the authority to conduct periodic inspections,48 set stand-
ards for the handling, housing, and feeding of research animals,49 and 
establish reporting, training, and internal review requirements.5o As 
characterized by Congress, the 1985 amendments "reflect[ed] the 
importance of the 'three R's': reduction in the number of animals used, 
refinement of cruel techniques, and replacement of animals with plants 
and computer simulations."51 
In sum, the Animal Welfare Act remains the core federal statute 
regulating animal use. It establishes that the treatment of animals in 
a wide range of settings represents a substantial government inter-
est.52 As currently amended, the AWA regulates research activities in 
41 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-309, at 85 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 731, 746 
(requiring that federal grantees, inter alia, establish animal care committees to monitor care 
and treatment of animals used in research). 
42 See S. REP. No. 99--145, at 593 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676,2519. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 2521. 
47 See Masonis, supra note 11, at 159. 
48 See 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (1994). 
49 See id. at § 2143(a). 
50 See id. at § 2143(a)(7), (b), (d). 
51 137 CONGo REC. E1295 (1991). 
52 See Benigni V. Maas, No. 93-2134, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31629, at *6 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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interstate and foreign commerce53 and applies to most facilities that 
use live animals in research.54 Through the creation of the AWA and 
its amendments, and through implementation of the Act by the USDA, 
Congress sought to ensure that minimum requirements regarding 
animal treatment within the United States would be met. However, 
enforcement of these standards has been hampered by court decisions 
denying public interest plaintiffs standing in cases challenging the 
substance and merit of the USDA's regulatory and enforcement prac-
tices under the AWA. 
II. AN INTRODUCTION To STANDING 
While the USDA has been delegated the job of fulfilling the AWA 
mandate, public oversight is a critical ingredient in ensuring that the 
Act is implemented in a fair and definite manner. Unfortunately, the 
courts have reduced the public's role in oversight, finding that animals 
and other third parties often do not have standing to seek redress of 
their claims under the AWA.55 Standing is an essential, "threshold 
determinant of the propriety of judicial intervention."56 In general, 
courts draw their standing requirements from two types of considera-
tions-constitutional and prudential.57 Constitutional considerations man-
date that "a plaintiff can have standing only if he satisfies the 'case or 
controversy' requirement of Article III" of the United States Consti-
tution.58 Once a plaintiff satisfies Article III, he or she then must 
satisfy the prudential concerns, which "arise from a perceived insti-
tutional need for judicial self-restraint rather than from the Consti-
tution itself."59 
A. Article III Standing 
The constitutional requirements for standing derive from Article 
Ill's mandate that federal jurisdiction extend only to those situations 
63 See Pinto v. Connecticut Dep't. of Envtl. Protection, Civ. No. B--S7--523, 1988 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4375, at *30 (D. Conn. 1988) ("The AWA regulates the safety and care of animals in the 
stream of commerce."). 
54 See generally Thomas DeCapo, Note, Challenging Objectionable Animal Treatment With 
The Shareholder Proxy Proposal Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 119, 126 (1988). 
55 See, e.g., Animal League Defense Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
56 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975). 
57 See Craig R. Gottlieb, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need To Separate Constitutional and 
Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PENN. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1994). 
58 [d. 
59 [d. 
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in which a plaintiff can demonstrate a "case or controversy" between 
himself and the defendant.60 Article III of the Constitution requires 
that a party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts meet an 
irreducible minimum containing three elements: First, the plaintiff 
must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized61 and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.62 Second, there must be 
a causal connection between the injury and the complained-of con-
duct-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some 
third party not before the court.63 Third, it must be "likely," as op-
posed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.64 
Thus, to meet the first requirement of Article III standing, plain-
tiffs must have a legally protected interest, allege injuries or threat-
ened injuries that are "concrete and particularized," and demonstrate 
that plaintiffs have "an actual stake in the outcome [of the case] that 
goes beyond intellectual or academic curiosity."65 Courts recognize 
three classes of legally-protected interests: constitutional, statutory, 
and judicially-created interests.66 In addition, the concrete and par-
ticularized "injury-in-fact" test requires a party seeking judicial re-
view be among the injured.67 However, the alleged injuries need not 
be particularly severe or costly; "even a minor or non-economic injury 
will satisfy the strictures of Article III."68 The Supreme Court has 
explained further that the requirement of a particularized injury 
"mean[s] that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way."69 Finally, the plaintiff's injury must be likely to occur70 
60 See Family & Children's Center, Inc. v. School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th 
Cir.1994). 
61 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
62 See id. 
63 See id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976». 
64 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 42). For purposes of jurisdictional issues, the 
courts must accept as true all the material allegations and construe the complaint in favor of 
the plaintiffs. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 666 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975». 
65 Family & Children's Center, Inc. v. School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 
1994); see also Schmidling v. City of Chicago, 1 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1993) (injury or threat 
"must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or 'hypothetical"'). 
66 See Gottlieb, supra note 57, at 1076. 
67 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734--35 (1972). 
68 Family & Children's Center, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1058. 
69 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.l (1992). 
70 See, e.g., Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 929--30 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. 
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and not be merely speculative.71 The determination whether an injury 
has occurred or is threatened does not lend itself to precise calculation 
and requires careful consideration of the individual circumstances in 
each case.72 
After meeting the injury requirements of Article III standing, a 
plaintiff must show that there is a causal relationship between the 
alleged injury and complained of illegal action (causation). 73 In most 
cases, the causation inquiry will be identical to the third requirement 
of Article III standing, redressability.74 "To the extent that a differ-
ence does exist, 'it is that the [causation inquiry] examines the causal 
connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged 
injury, whereas the [redressability inquiry] examines the causal connec-
tion between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested."'75 In 
sum, a plaintiff can satisfy both the second and third elements of 
Article III standing by showing that his or her injury "fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a 
favorable decision."76 
B. Prudential Standing 
In addition to meeting the constitutional minimums necessary to 
confer standing, the plaintiffs often must satisfy the prudential ele-
ments established for standing. In cases challenging the actions of 
federal agencies, these requirements are set out in the Administrative 
Procedure Act:77 plaintiffs must demonstrate they are within the "zone 
of interest" Congress sought to protect by enacting the statutes un-
der which the action is brought.78 "For prudential standing, a plaintiff 
usually must show, in addition [to the elements of constitutional stand-
ing], that 'the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 
the statute ... in question."'79 "The essential inquiry is whether Con-
gress 'intended for a particular class of plaintiffs to be relied on to 
denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992) (injury prong of standing test must meet an independent require-
ment of imminence). 
71 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). 
72 See Schmidling v. City of Chicago, 1 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1993). 
73 See Gottlieb, supra note 57, at 1070. 
74 See id. at 1085. 
75 [d. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984». 
76 Schmidling, 1 F.3d at 498 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 145, 155 (1990». 
77 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (judicial review of agency action). 
78 See Banks v. Secretary of Ind. Family & Social Servo Admin., 997 F.2d 231, 241-42 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
79 National Recycling Coalition, Inc. V. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting 
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challenge the agency disregard of the law."'OO As courts have noted, 
"while the zone test is obviously meant to serve as a limitation on 
those who can use the federal courts to challenge agency action, it is 
'a quite generous standard,'" exemplified by the use of the terms 
"arguably" and "zone."81 Courts have found further that satisfying the 
"zone of interest" test is "not ... especially demanding."82 A plaintiff 
need demonstrate only that his or her claim has a "'plausible relation-
ship' to at least one of the policies or concerns that motivated Con-
gress to take legislative action."83 Furthermore, the "zone of inter-
ests" inquiry begins with the presumption that all plaintiffs who meet 
Article III standing requirements have prudential standing to chal-
lenge agencies.84 All that remains to be determined is whether Con-
gress intended to preclude a certain class of plaintiffs from bringing 
an action. so 
III. STANDING UNDER THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 
A. The Animal As Plaintiff 
In his much publicized 1972 dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, Jus-
tice William O. Douglas asked the controversial question of whether 
or not trees should have standing.so Douglas felt that full implemen-
tation of environmental protection legislation might require granting 
elements of nature standing to sue. With the passage of the AWA, it 
has become appropriate to ask whether, for full implementation of the 
Act, animals in their own right have standing as plaintiffs, or whether 
at a minimum third parties claiming to represent such animals should 
have standing to sue under'the statute. 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1988) and Association 
of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). 
80 Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334, 1341-42 (D. Minn. 1996) (quoting Clarke v. Securities 
Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) and Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 
(1984)). 
81 Southern Mutual Help Assoc. v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Tax 
Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
82 Banks, 997 F.2d at 242 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400). 
83 [d. (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972); see also Christopher D. Stone, 
Should Trees Have Standing-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 
450, 456-57 (1972). 
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The issue is not without precedent. Over the years, animal species 
have been named as plaintiffs in several legal actions and have achieved 
standing when not challenged by opposing parties.87 In several cases 
brought under statutes other than the AWA, the courts have analyzed 
the plausibility of animals meeting the standing requirements.88 
The stage was set for animals becoming plaintiffs in the 1988 case 
of Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources.89 In 
this case, plaintiffs were challenging an action under the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) and named a bird species as one of the plaintiffs. 
Although the defendants did not contest the bird's status as plaintiff, 
the court stated: 
As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act ... 
the bird (Loxioides bailleui) , a member of the Hawaiian honey-
creeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into federal 
court as a plaintiff in its own right ... represented by attorneys 
for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental 
parties.90 
Based upon this dicta, public interest plaintiffs brought several sub-
sequent cases attempting to have courts grant standing to animal 
species, but these plaintiffs were not successful in extending standing 
to non-human animals.91 In Hawaiian Crow (,Alala) v. Lujan, a fed-
eral district court ruled that the 'Alala, an endangered species of bird, 
did not have standing to maintain a suit challenging a program under 
the ESA.92 The court reasoned that the ESA citizen suit provisions 
provided for suits brought by "persons," not animals, and that other 
plaintiff environmental organizations met the standing requirements.93 
In similar cases, the courts have found that individual animals did 
not have standing.94 In the most famous of such suits, a dolphin named 
Kama was found not to have standing to challenge a transfer of its 
87 See, e.g., Mt. Graham Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703, 703 (9th Cir. 1991); Northern Spotted 
Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 
F. Supp. 479, 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
88 See, e.g., Citizens To End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquar-
ium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 48-49 (D. Mass. 1993). 
89 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
90 Id. at 1107. 
91 See, e.g., Citizens To End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc., 836 F. Supp. at 45; see 
generally Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, No. 91--00191-DAE (D. Haw. Sept. 13, 1991). 
92 See Citizens To End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc., 836 F. Supp. at 49 (citing 
Hawaiian Crow, No. 91--OO191-DAE). 
93 See id. 
94 See, e.g., id. at 45. 
806 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:795 
location to the Naval Oceans Systems Center under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA).95 Following the court's reasoning in Hawai-
ian Crow, the district court found that the MMPA expressly author-
ized suits by persons, not animals.96 In yet another case, a person 
seeking damages for pesticide exposure on behalf of herself and, inter 
alia, three opossums and five neighborhood cats who died, summarily 
was denied standing to sue on behalf of neighborhood animals that 
were not her property.97 Thus, despite the dicta in Palila, courts 
routinely have denied animals standing to serve as plaintiffs. 
B. Past Animal Welfare Act Cases 
Since the passage of the AWA, animal rights advocates have sought 
to use the Act as a means of enforcing statutory requirements for the 
treatment of animals in an ethical and humane manner.98 This interest 
was bolstered by early court decisions under other statutes such as 
the MMPA,99 which provided animal welfare organizations with stand-
ing to bring suit under federal laws to protect the well-being of 
animals. lOll 
Until 1986, however, the courts had not resolved the question of 
whether animal welfare organizations, much less animals themselves, 
had standing to sue under the AWA to protect animals, or even 
whether a private cause of action could be implied under the AW A.lOl 
In 1986, private individuals and the International Primate Protection 
League (IPPL) brought an action seeking to be named guardians of 
medical research animals seized from a research organization (oper-
ating under a National Institutes of Health (NIH) grant) convicted of 
state animal cruelty violations.102 The lawsuit also challenged the pri-
96 See id. at 49-50; 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1407 (1995). 
96 See Citizens to End Animal SUffering and Exploitation, Inc., 836 F. Supp. at 49. 
97 See Jensen v. County of Santa Clara, 69 F.3d 544, Nos. 94-16063, 94-16824,1995 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 31565, at *7-*8 (Oct. 26, 1995). 
98 See generally McDonald, supra note 4, at 400. 
99 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407. 
100 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (''Where an act 
is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness toward animals, who are uniquely 
incapable of defending their own interests in court, it strikes us as eminently logical to allow 
groups specifically concerned with aninIal welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in enforcing 
the statute."). 
101 See A. Camille Holton, Note, International Primate Protection League v. Institute for 
Behavioral Research: The Standing of Animal Protection Organizations Under The Animal 
Welfare Act, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 469, 470 (1988). 
102 See International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc., 
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mary medical researcher's failure to comply with the AWA standards 
for the care of laboratory animals.lo3 The case represented the first 
federal court decision concerning standing under the AWA. 
In International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behav-
ioral Research, Inc. (International Primate Protection League), the 
plaintiffs asserted that they would suffer financial and non-financial 
injuries if the defendant regained control of the mistreated research 
monkeys.104 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected the plaintiffs' financial-based arguments that their tax 
payments created an entitlement of assurance that the NIH and its 
grant recipients complied with the AWA,105 and that the plaintiffs' 
personal expenditure of funds in maintaining the animals while in 
state custody created a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy.106 The non-financial injuries alleged were two-fold. First, the 
plaintiffs alleged a detrimental impact to the IPPL members' personal 
interest in the preservation and humane treatment of animals.107 The 
court rejected this argument based upon court precedent that "a mere 
interest in a problem; no matter how longstanding the interest and 
no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, 
is not sufficient by itself to create standing."108 Second, the plaintiffs 
asserted that the return of the monkeys to the defendant would 
disrupt their personal relationship with the animals.109 The court re-
jected this argument, reasoning that the plaintiffs' personal relation-
ships with the monkeys only existed because of the litigation at hand 
and, thus, could not create an injury on which to predicate standingYo 
799 F.2d 934, 936 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987); see also Taub v. State, 463 
A.2d 819, 819-20 (Md. 1983) (reversing earlier conviction of researcher under state animal 
cruelty law for failing to provide necessary care for animals of interest in International Primate 
Protection League). 
103 See International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 935, 936; see also Taub, 463 A.2d 
at 819-20. 
104 See International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 937. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. at 938. 
107 See id. (plaintiffs specifically sought standing by describing themselves as "individuals and 
members having a personal interest in the preservation and encouragement of civilized and 
humane treatment of animals, whose own aesthetic, conservational, and environmental interests 
are specifically and particularly offended and affected by the matters hereinafter described, and 
which interests, along with their educational interests, will be detrimentally impacted upon if 
the relief sought is not granted"). 
108 Id. 
109 See International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 938. 
110 See id. 
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While International Primate Protection League denied standing 
based upon the inadequacy of the specific injuries alleged by the 
plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs failed to 
prove that the AWA authorized their right to seek relief.111 After 
highlighting legislative intent that the AWA not chill progress in 
medical research, the court determined that enforcement of the AWA 
was not to be realized through a succession of private lawsuits, and 
that the Act did not imply any provision for lawsuits by private 
individuals as a complement to the authority of the Secretary of 
Agriculture.ll2 In sum, the decision in International Primate Protec-
tion League prevented third parties from suing researchers under the 
AWA for violations of the Act. 
The prohibition against third-party enforcement suits established 
by International Primate Protection League was quickly adopted by 
other courts. In 1990, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA) sued the University of Oregon's Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee for, inter alia, violating the AWA by approving a 
professor's grant proposal to study the auditory system of barn owls.u3 
In reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals of Oregon adopted the 
decision in the International Primate Protection League case, with-
out analysis particularized to the case at hand.u4 The court adopted 
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in International Primate Protection 
League "that private individuals and organizations, including PETA, 
do not have standing to sue in federal court for alleged violations."u5 
The Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the lower court's decision, and 
also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing under a state 
statute allowing for petitions of judicial review.u6 
The lack of specificity in the PETA v. Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee of the University of Oregon decision allows for at 
least two interpretations of the holding. Interpreted broadly, the 
court's decision could be viewed as a continuation of the International 
Primate Protection League rule that third parties may not use the 
AWA to sue researchers who violate the Act. Thus, the court may 
111 See id. at 938--39. 
112 See id. at 940-4l. 
113 See PETA v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Comm. of U niv. of Or., 794 P.2d 1224, 1225 
(Or. Ct. App. 1990). 
114 See id. at 1226-28. 
115 I d. at 1227. 
116 PETA v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Comm. ofUniv. of Or., 817 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Or. 
1991). 
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have been indicating that the AWA was not designed to accommodate 
significant public legal challenges and denial of standing enabled the 
courts to limit or deny public challenges. However, the court decision 
also could be interpreted narrowly as a holding restricted to chal-
. lenges of decisions by an IACUC. From this perspective, the court 
could be seen as limiting third-party involvement only to public par-
ticipation in the make-up and charge of the IACUC, and finding that 
the public is barred statutorily from challenges concerning the quality 
and substance of IACUC participation. ll7 
Subsequent to PETA, the lower courts continued to bolster the 
International Primate Protection League decision. In 1991, several 
animal organizations brought suit against the Cleveland Metroparks 
Zoo alleging that the move of a lowland gorilla from one zoo to another 
for purposes of mating violated, inter alia, the AWA.ns Following the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in International Primate Protection League, 
the district court found that the AWA does not provide a cause of 
action for private suits to enforce its terms.119 
In summary, the International Primate Protection League, PETA, 
and Metroparks Zoo cases set a judicial tone against standing for 
third parties under the AWA.120 The legacy of these decisions is an 
extension of the long established precedent that public citizens cannot 
sue an agency solely for the agency's failure to enforce the law. As 
the United States Supreme Court established in Heckler v. Chaney, 
an agency's refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is discretion-
117 See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Comm. of the 
Univ. of Vt., 616 A.2d 224, 227 (Vt. 1992) (finding IACUC subject to state Open Meeting Law 
and state Public Record Act); Citizens for Alternatives to Animal Labs, Inc. v. Board of Trustees 
of State Univ. of N.Y., 643 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding IACUC subject to 
state Freedom of Information Law); Dorson v. State of Louisiana, 657 So. 2d 755, 757 (La. Ct. 
App. 1995) (finding IACUC not subject to state Open Meetings Law); Students for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines, 399 S.E.2d 340, 344 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) 
(finding IACUC records subject to limited disclosure under state Public Records Act provided 
identifying information of researchers is redacted and unapproved grant applications remain 
confidential). Contra Medlock v. Board of Trustees ofUniv. of Mass., 580 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991) (finding IACUC not subject to open meeting law); American Soc'y for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y., 568 N.Y.S.2d 631, 
632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding IACUC was not a "public body" within the meaning of state 
open meeting law). 
118 See In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 
1991) [hereinafter Metroparks Zoo]. 
119 See id. at 103. 
120 See International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc., 
799 F.2d 934, 941 (4th Cir. 1986); PETA v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Comm. of the Univ. 
of Or., 817 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Or. 1991); Metroparks Zoo, 785 F. Supp. at 103. 
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ary and not subject to review, unless Congress has indicated other-
wise.l2l Indeed, the AWA cases through Metroparks Zoo held that the 
legislative history of the AWA retained enforcement decisions exclu-
sively within the discretion of the United States Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA), and that the public may not circumvent Agency 
discretion by bringing an action to compel enforcement under the 
AWA.l22 Ultimately, courts have found that decisions to enforce the 
AWA are within the sole discretion of the USDA.l23 
Despite the holdings limiting judicial review of the AWA, third 
parties have continued to file AWA claims. Several recent cases have 
reexamined standing in actions brought against the USDA for deci-
sions in implementing the AWA. In Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Espy (ALDF /),124 for example, two animal rights organizations and 
two individuals sued the USDA under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)125 for implementing a regulatory definition of "animal" that 
excluded birds, aquatic animals, rats, and mice in violation of the AWA 
amendments of 1970, which had expanded greatly the definition of 
"animal."126 In the district court, the plaintiffs prevailed over the 
Agency's motion to dismiss for lack of standing.127 The plaintiff organi-
zation's injury to its informational activities resulting from the USDA's 
action was deemed to satisfy the constitutional requirements of stand-
ing.l28 The court further found that the plaintiffs satisfied the require-
ments of prudential standing because "the defendants . . . failed to 
demonstrate that it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to 
permit this lawsuit."129 In a subsequent decision, the district court also 
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment concerning the 
USDA's failure to implement an expanded regulatory definition of 
"animal."130 The case was appealed immediately to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.131 
Applying the Article III standing requirements from Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife and the traditional prudential standing test, the 
121 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985). 
122 See, e.g., International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 941. 
123 See, e.g., id. 
124 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
120 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
126 See ALDF 1,23 F.3d at 497-98. 
127 See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Yeutter, 760 F. Supp. 923, 924 (D.D.C. 1991). 
128 See id. at 925. 
129 I d. at 928. 
130 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Madigan, 781 F. Supp. 797, 799 (D.D.C. 1992). 
131 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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court of appeals overruled the district court and denied both the 
animal organizations and the individual plaintiffs standing.132 For each 
of the plaintiffs the court found a particular requirement of standing 
unsatisfied.133 First, the court addressed the injuries of a psychobiolo-
gist who had worked with rats and mice at various laboratories reg-
istered with the USDA under the AWA.l34 The plaintiff alleged that 
the Agency's failure to include rats and mice within the AWNs defini-
tion of "animal" made her unable to control her employer institutions' 
treatment of rats and mice and the resulting inhumane treatment of 
such animals impaired her ability to perform her professional duties.135 
Overlooking the aesthetic and professional injuries alleged, the court 
found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the constitutional elements of 
standing because she no longer worked in the registered laborato-
ries. l36 As a result, the plaintiff failed to satisfy Lujan's requirement 
that her injury be presently suffered or imminently threatened.137 
Additionally, the court found that her claim rested primarily upon an 
assertion of future injury; that she will be engaged in research dealing 
with rats and mice in the future. 13B The court concluded that the 
plaintiff's claims of injury were not about to occur and would be 
suffered only if she chose to engage in such work.139 As the court 
stated, "[ w ]hether she will do so is wholly within her control."140 
Second, the court addressed the injuries of a plaintiff lawyer and 
member of an IACUC which oversees research facilities registered 
with the USDA under the AWA.14l The plaintiff alleged that the 
USDNs failure to define "animals" adequately left him, a chosen over-
sight representative of the general community, without relevant guid-
ance upon which to judge a registered facility's treatment of birds, 
rats, and mice.l42 He further claimed that the USDNs actions pre-
vented him from performing his statutory duties for the committee.143 
132 See id. at 504. 
133 See id. at 500--01. 
134 See id. at 500. 
135 See id. 
136 See ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 500. 
137 See id. 
138 But see id. at 504-06 (Williams, J., dissenting in part) (finding plaintiff met requirements 
of standing). 
139 See id. at 500. 
140 Id. 
141 See ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 501. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
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The court found that this claim failed to present any cognizable injury 
and amounted to nothing more than an attempt to compel executive 
enforcement of the law detached from any factual claim of injury.l44 
This determination appears to be consistent with the judicial principle 
of the Heckler v. Chaney and International Primate Protection League 
v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc. findings that third parties 
do not have standing to compel enforcement of the AWA.l45 
Third, the court addressed the alleged injuries of two organizational 
plaintiffs asserting informational standing.l46 The plaintiffs claimed 
that the USDA's exclusive definition of "animal" hampered their at-
tempts to gather and disseminate information on laboratory condi-
tions of these animals.147 The plaintiffs reasoned that if the definition 
of "animal" were broadened, regulated laboratories would be obli-
gated legally to provide information about the treatment of the ani-
mals to the USDA, which in turn would include the information in the 
Secretary's annual report to Congress.l48 The organizations then could 
acquire the information and use it in public education and rulemaking 
proceedings.149 The court found that the plaintiffs' alleged "informa-
tional standing" met the Article III standing requirements, but failed 
to meet the prudential "zone of interest" requirements.150 The plain-
tiffs failed to show a congressional intent to benefit the organization 
or some indication that the organization was a peculiarly suitable 
challenger of administrative neglect.l5l The court found that the AWA 
precluded any showing that the informational and educational inter-
ests of the plaintiff organizations were in any way peculiar to the 
organizations.152 The court further found that the congressional intent 
to entrust the IACUCs with the function of oversight and dissemina-
tion of information precluded the plaintiff organizations from assert-
ing that their informational injury made them "peculiarly suitable 
challenger[s] of administrative neglect."l53 
144 See id. 
145 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985); International Primate Protection League 
v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 937-38 (1986). 
146 See ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 501--04; see generally Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic 
Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (granting informational standing). 
147 See ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 501. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
160 Id. at 501~2. 
161 See id. at 503 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988». 
162 See ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 503. 
153 Id. 
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Thus, ALDF I indicates further limits upon attempts to seek stand-
ing in cases brought under the AWA. Specifically, the court suggests 
that attempts to seek informational standing will never meet the 
prudential standing requirements.154 A dissent by Judge Williams, 
however, indicates that certain plaintiffs may suffer the requisite 
injuries to achieve standing.155 
Williams argued that the plaintiff psychobiologist had met the stand-
ing requirements and noted that the inhumane treatment of any animal 
the psychobiologist might purchase for any privately conducted re-
search would establish a sufficient injury to convey standing.156 As a 
result, the application of the Article III test to the individual plaintiffs 
and the dissent by Judge Williams finding that the plaintiff psychobi-
ologist met the standing requirements suggest that courts are unwill-
ing to foreclose all plaintiffs from gaining standing under the AWA. 
The subsequent decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Espy (ALDF 11)157 expanded upon the decision of ALDF 1. Plaintiffs 
consisting of some of the same parties in ALDF I, other individuals, 
and additional animal welfare organizations, successfully challenged 
the USDA's promulgation of final regulations158 designed to conform 
to the 1985 amendments of the AWA,159 also known as the Improved 
Standards for Laboratory Animals Act,160 at the district court leve1.161 
Upon review, the court of appeals held that all of the plaintiffs lacked 
standing.162 
Using the same reasoning as in ALDF I, the court immediately 
rejected the standing of the plaintiffs who had participated in ALDF 
1.163 The identical injuries asserted in this case by an individual plain-
tiff member of an IACUC and two animal organizations were rejected 
by recounting and referencing the reasoning in ALDF [.164 Next, the 
court turned its attention to a plaintiff primate housing system com-
pany and the company's president as an individual plaintiff.165 These 
154 See id. 
166 See id. at 504 (Williams, J., dissenting in part). 
156 See id. at 504-06 & n2 (Williams, J., dissenting in part). 
157 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter ALDF Il]. 
168 See 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.b(d), 3.8, 3.80, 3.81 (1996). 
159 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99--198, §§ 1751--59,99 Stat. 1645 (1985) (codified at 
7 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2132, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2149, 2157 (1994». 
160 See Masonis, supra note 11, at 151, 158 & n.58. 
161 See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Secretary of Agric., 813 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1992). 
162 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 724-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
163 See id. at 723-24. 
164 See id. 
166 See id. at 724. 
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plaintiffs alleged that the inadequate regulations resulted in their 
inability to sell primate housing systems for pairs or groups of pri-
mates.166 Responding to the plaintiffs' economic claims, the court stated 
that "the [AWAJ's purpose is to promote the humane treatment of 
animals, not the sale of any particular housing systems."167 The court 
denied these plaintiffs standing for failing to meet the prudential 
standing requirements. l68 Focusing only on the AWNs "zone of inter-
est," the court failed to analyze whether these plaintiffs met the 
Article III standing requirements.169 
Finally, the court addressed the standing of an individual plaintiff 
who was the director of a chimpanzee and human communications 
center.170 This plaintiff claimed that the "vagueness" of the USDNs 
promulgated regulations injured him by preventing him from estab-
lishing a plan for his chimpanzee research institute and, in particular, 
from addressing how a chimpanzee housing facility currently under 
construction would comply with the USDA standards.l7l 
First, the court held that plaintiff did not assert a distinct and 
palpable injury to himself.172 Reasoning that the plaintiff alleged inju-
ries to his employing facility rather than himself, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff did not risk any personal injury in the event of 
noncompliance with the AWA and could not claim standing based upon 
potential harm to his employer.173 Second, even if the court assumed 
the plaintiff did face some personal harm from his employer's noncom-
pliance with the AWA, the prospect of such an injury did not satisfy 
the imminence requirements of Article III standing.174 
Although the holding in ALDF II suggests that plaintiffs may have 
a difficult time establishing standing under the AWA, a different 
conclusion can be drawn from the concurrence of Chief Judge Mikva.175 
In his concurrence, Mikva directly addressed the failure of the plain-
tiffs, especially the public interest organizations, to allege injuries 
adequate to confer standing.176 In what is sure to become an argument 
166 See id. 
167 ALDF II, 29 F.3d at 724. 
168 See id. at 724-25. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 725. 
l71 See id. 
172 See ALDF II, 29 F.3d at 725. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 726 (Mikva, J., concurring). 
176 See id. (Mikva, J., concurring). 
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for future actions brought by public interest organizations, the judge 
stated: 
Had the public interest organizations and individuals challenging 
the Secretary's regulations alleged an interest in protecting the 
well-being of specific laboratory animals (an interest predating 
this litigation), I think appellees would have had standing to chal-
lenge those regulations for providing insufficient protection to the 
animals. Such allegation would satisfy the requirements for con-
stitutional standing, as enumerated in [Lujan]. This claim would 
also place appellees within the "zone of interests" of the Animal 
Welfare Act: the Act, too, aspires to protect laboratory animals. 
But appellees never made this claim, and they had the burden of 
demonstrating the specific basis of their standing.!77 
Whether future plaintiffs take Judge Mikva up on this offer remains 
to be seen. Nonetheless, the most recent cases under the A WA, and 
especially Judge Mikva's concurrence, suggest that third parties will 
not be rejected summarily under Article III and prudential standing 
requirements and, once the proper formula is found, may use the 
AWA as an effective tool to compel the USDA to implement fully 
regulations for the humane treatment of animals. 
Indeed, the recent United States District Court decision in Animal 
Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman (Glickman) indicates that some 
judges are willing to use the Mikva road map and grant standing to 
an animal protection organization or individuals seeking to rectify 
errors and delays in the implementation of humane care regulations.178 
In Glickman, organizational and individual plaintiffs sued the USDA 
for, inter alia, its regulatory failure to require animal exhibitors to 
submit plans for primate psychological well-being and the agency's 
unreasonable delay in promulgating regulations requiring federal sub-
mission and approval of such plans.179 The case brought by an animal 
rights organizational plaintiff and individual plaintiffs consisted of two 
individuals described as animal lovers and a third retired park ranger 
and former humane investigator. ISO The organizational plaintiffs as-
serted standing based upon: long standing interest in the particular 
issue at hand; the informational injuries it suffered from not being 
able to review and distribute government-approved primate plans; 
177 ALDF II, 29 F.3d at 726 (Mikva, J., concurring). 
178 See generally Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, No. 96-00408, slip op. (D.D.C. Oct. 
30,1996). 
179 See id. at 4-5. 
180 See id. at 22-23. 
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and the significant organizational resources it had spent on this issue 
and other animal welfare issues administered under the AWA.181 Spe-
cifically, the individual plaintiffs detailed their aesthetic and emotional 
injuries incurred by witnessing the ongoing inhumane housing of 
primates at several local zoos. 
In an extraordinary ruling, United States District Court Judge 
Charles Richey granted both the organizational and individual plain-
tiffs standing under the A WA.182 The decision shed further light on 
the breadth of the decisions in both ALDF I and ALDF II. Richey 
found that the organizational plaintiff's claim of informational injury 
in the prior ALDF cases had satisfied the requirements of Lujan's 
Article III test and, thus, met the burden of Constitutional standing.1&'l 
Nonetheless, in those two cases the statutory standing, or prudential 
standing, had not been met by the organizational plaintiff.l84 In the 
Glickman decision, however, Richey distinguished the type of infor-
mation sought in ALDF I and II from the case at hand.185 In ALDF I 
and II the organizational plaintiff sought information concerning re-
search facilities that was normally the province of the statutorily 
created IACUCs and, thus, fell outside the "zone of interests" pro-
tected by the AWA. In contrast, the court found that, in this case, the 
organization sought information covering exhibitors for whom there 
is no statutorily created public oversight body similar to an IACUC. 
Therefore, the court found that the organization's informational inju-
ries fell within the AWNs "zone of interest" protection and that the 
organization was a particularly suitable challenger to the defendant's 
administrative neglect.186 
In addressing the individual plaintiffs, the court found that the 
specificity with which the plaintiffs alleged their injuries gave rise to 
standing to sue under the AWA.187 By alleging their individual and 
continuous injuries in witnessing partiCUlar inhumane primate exhib-
its, the plaintiffs were able to establish personal and direct injuries 
that were distinguishable from injuries suffered by the public at large.1&'l 
Moreover, the court found these injuries fairly traceable to the USDNs 
181 See id. at 15-22. 
182 See id. at 14-31. 
183 See Glickman, No. 96-00408, at 19. 
184 See id. at 20. 
185 See id. at 19. 
186 See id. at 19-22. 
187 See id. at 23-27. 
188 See Glickman, No. 96-00408, at 25-27. 
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failure to promulgate regulations for a physical environment adequate 
to promote the psychological well-being of primates.189 Thus, the court 
found that the relief sought would redress these injuries and that the 
plaintiffs fell within the AWNs "zone of interest."l90 
Clearly, the district court's decision in Glickman has provided ani-
mal welfare advocates with hope that the courts have carved out a 
standing niche for organizational and individual plaintiffs. However, 
an intervenor in the case, the National Association for Biomedical 
Research, along with the USDA, appealed the Glickman standing 
decision in January of 1997. Should the court of appeals uphold the 
Glickman decision, the substantive merits of many actions brought 
under the AWA finally may be addressed. 
IV. PET CONSUMERS AND FUTURE PLAINTIFFS 
Successful use of the AWA to seek greater federal supervision of 
animal welfare will be highly dependent on selecting plaintiffs capable 
of satisfying the standing requirements. The decisions in Interna-
tional Primate Protection League, PETA, and Metropark Zoo have 
established that third parties will not be able to bring legal actions 
against individual AWA violators as a way of circumscribing the USDNs 
discretionary enforcement.l91 Similarly, the decisions in ALDF I and 
II indicate that animal welfare organizations will be unable to claim 
informational injuries related to IACUC activities to meet the stand-
ing requirements of Article III and prudential standing.192 However, 
the ALDF I and ALDF II decisions do suggest that third parties are 
able to sue the federal government concerning its implementation of 
the AWA so long as the plaintiffs fulfill the standing requirements of 
Lujan.193 While the court of appeals mulls over the standing issue in 
the Glickman appeal, the concurrence in ALDF II still suggests that 
plaintiffs alleging an interest in protecting the well-being of specific 
animals may meet the requisite injuries and fall within the "zone of 
189 Id. at 27. 
190 See id. at 28-31. 
191 See In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785 F. Supp. 100, 101 (D. Ohio 
1991); International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 
934,934 (4th Cir. 1986); PETA v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Comm. of the Univ. of Or., 
817 P.2d 1299, 1299 (Or. 1991). 
192 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
193 See ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 496; ALDF II, 29 F.3d at 720. 
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interest" necessary to confer standing by demonstrating a careful and 
well-thought-out interest in protecting certain animals. 
One potential plaintiff is the individual who is a pet owner and/or a 
"consumer" buying pets. In theory, a pet consumer could be able to 
take Judge Mikva up on his offer and challenge USDA implementa-
tion of the A WA as it relates to regulation of pet dealers. Such a 
plaintiff could express an interest in the animals he or she has exam-
ined when considering an imminent purchase or express an economic 
injury caused by the purchase of an unhealthy pet. While such injuries 
might appear as indirect injuries caused by the USDA, they would 
not preclude a plaintiff consumer's standing.194 
While the Mikva concurrence suggests that such a consumer inter-
est may satisfy the Article III requirements, the potential bar to such 
standing would be the prudential requirements. In Block v. Commu-
nity Nutrition Institute, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the congressional intent of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 
Act precluded standing for consumers of dairy products to obtain 
judicial review of milk market orders issued by the Secretary of 
Agriculture.195 Thus, the legislative history of the AWA must be re-
visited to understand the role legislation plays in protecting consum-
ers. Unlike Block, the AWA does not express a "fairly discernible" 
congressional intent to preclude pet consumers from standing. While 
the AWA contains no particular provisions granting or limiting who 
may sue under it, the legislative history suggests that pet consumers 
are well within the realm of potential plaintiffs.196 In fact, the legisla-
tive history of the AWA is filled with references to Congress' intent 
to regulate the transfer of animals, especially cats and dogs, in com-
merce.197 With such a legislative history, the courts would be hard 
194 See Robinson Rubber Prod. Co. v. Hennepin County, No. 4-95-220,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4365, at *12-*18 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 1996). 
195 See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 340 (1984); see also Overton Power 
Dist. No.5 v. Valley Elec. Assoc., Inc., 73 F.3d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the Boulder 
Canyon Project 9 (Hoover Dam) statute, 43 U.S.C. § 619a, expressed a "fairly discernible" 
congressional intent that only contractors named in statute have standing to challenge rateset-
ting decisions). 
196 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5105. 
197 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94--801, at 24 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 776 (stating 
that this legislation "is intended to eliminate a major problem with the shipment of unhealthy 
or unsound dogs and cats for the pet trade"); H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5108 (amending the definition of "affecting commerce" to include "or 
held for sale as pets"); S. REP. No. 89-1281, at 16 (1966), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 
2647 (statement of Fred B. Smith, acting General Counsel of the Treasury). 
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pressed to find pet consumers outside the "zone of interest" of the 
AWA. In analogous cases, the courts have held that consumers can 
meet the standing requirements of Article III.198 Indeed, consumers 
who challenged the Food and Drug Administration's approval of a 
genetically engineered cow hormone were found to meet both the 
Article III and prudential standing requirements.199 In that case, a 
district court specifically found that the intent of the Federal Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act was to protect consumers' well-being.20o With 
an analogous legislative history, the AWA would appear to support 
similar consumer-based legal actions. In late 1996, the Doris Day 
Animal League and several pet consumers filed a legal action against 
the USDA that may compel the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to address the issue of pet consumer standing.201 
The lawsuit alleges, inter alia, that the USDA has failed to regulate 
hunting, security, and breeding dog dealers as mandated by the AWA.202 
Whether the Glickman decision and Judge Mikva's concurrence in 
ALDF II carry over into this area of the AWA remains to be seen. 
However, the decisions certainly create a more favorable judicial 
climate in which to pursue a consumer-based legal challenge.203 
CONCLUSION 
The AWA just celebrated its thirtieth year of existence. Compared 
to many environmental statutes, the Act has seen only sporadic use 
as a legal weapon throughout its existence. The ever-narrowing inter-
pretation of standing under the AWA has limited the pool of plaintiffs 
able to bring AWA claims before the courts, and thereby limited the 
number of claims filed. Thus far, court decisions have dismissed a 
number of possible plaintiff groups, including individuals seeking en-
forcement of the AWA, members of statutorily mandated Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committees, animal researchers seeking re-
search facility AWA compliance, and business entities with tangential 
economic interests in animal care regulation. 
198 See, e.g., Barnes v. Shalala, 865 F. Supp. 550, 560 (W.D. Wis. 1994). 
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 561. 
201 See Doris Day Animal League v. Glickman, No. 96-02806 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 19, 1996). 
202 See id. 
203 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, No. 96-00408, slip. op. at 17 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 
1996); Animal League Defense Fund v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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Yet, these court decisions have not foreclosed third-party use of the 
AWA fully. While the courts may never allow animals standing under 
the Act, third parties representing the interests of animals, through 
careful selection of plaintiffs, still may be able to satisfy the constitu-
tional and prudential elements of standing. Moreover, the recent lower 
court decision in Glickman suggests that the judicial climate may be 
becoming more amenable to suits brought under the AWA. Whether 
achieved through the courts or through further amendment of the 
Act, allowing third-party legal standing under the AWA undoubtedly 
would reinvigorate use of the AWA as a means of protecting animals 
from widespread abuse. 
